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ARGUMENTS
I.

BECAUSE MR. ALBERT AGREES WITH THE PREMISE THAT
ORDERS DEALING WITH §34A-2-413 ARE NOT FINAL APPEALABLE
ORDERS UNTIL AFTER ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 413 HAVE
BEEN MET, THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS CASE TO THE
LABOR COMMISSION FOR A SECOND-STEP PROCEEDING
CONSISTENT WITH § 413

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 specifically mandates that an order of the Labor
Commission is not final until notice of a second-step proceeding is sent to the parties involved
and the parties have an opportunity to submit a rehabilitation plan at a rehabilitation hearing
conducted by the Commission. Mr. Johnny Albert (hereinafter "Mr. Albert") agrees that the
plain language of the statute provides that an order of permanent total disability is not final until
the second step proceeding occurs or the parties waive their right to the proceeding. See, Mr.
Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 5. Based upon this recognition of the plain language of the statute,
Mr. Albert does not dispute the fact the plain language of the statute is explicit and, therefore, the
Court of Appeals erred when it attempted to harmonize the statute with the Labor Commission
rule.
Specifically, Mr. Albert argues that this Court should strike the administrative rule that
provides that a tentative finding of permanent total disability is a final agency action for purposes
of review. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 6, Note 2. Mr. Albert explicitly provides that
"[t]he Rule [Utah Admin. Code R612-l-10.C.l(c)] must yield to the statute, and this Court
should strike this Rule." Id. In essence, Mr. Albert is arguing the same points that Ameritemps
argued in its Appellants' Brief - that the Court of Appeals erred in synthesizing the
administrative rule with the statute and the plain language of the statute should be enforced in
this case.
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Mr. Albert attempts to argue that Ameritemps stipulated to a final order of disability
and/or waived its rights to a second step proceeding. This argument is without merit and is not
properly before this Court as Mr. Albert failed to challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling on
whether Ameritemps stipulated to a final order of permanent total disability. See, Ameritemps,
Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, f 13, 128 P.3d 31. Ameritemps hereby adopts the
arguments made in its Motion to Strike Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee Brief, attached to
the Appendix hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference.
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Ameritemps did not stipulate to a final
order of permanent total disability, nor did it waive its rights to a second step rehabilitation
proceeding. Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491, f 13. Mr. Albert did not appeal this finding by the
Court of Appeals and, therefore, the Court of Appeals ruling regarding the same stands as the
issue is not properly before this Court for determination.
Moreover, this Court has provided that the only issue properly before it for review is
"[w]hether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." See, Order dated March 29,
2006 (hereinafter the "Order"), attached to the Appendix hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated
herein by this reference. As the issue of whether a stipulation did or did not occur is outside the
scope of the issue certified for review by this Court, the issue is moot as it is not properly before
this Court.
Regardless, Mr. Albert concedes in his briefing that Utah Administrative Rule R612-110.C.l(c) was improperly utilized by the Utah Court of Appeals and should be stricken from the
Rules. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 6. As a result of this concession, Mr. Albert is in
agreement with Ameritemps' argument that the Court of Appeals decision should be overturned
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for improperly synthesizing the Rule with the statute. The result of overturning the Court of
Appeals decision and upholding the plain language of § 34A-2-413 is to remand this case for a
second-step rehabilitation proceeding consistent with the statute.
REPLY TO AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT
II.

UNION PACIFIC IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE §34a-2-413 ITSELF DETAILS WHEN A
FINAL AGENCY ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL HAS
OCCURRED, THEREBY OBVIATING THE NEED FOR THE UNION
PACIFIC ANALYSIS

American Asbestos Abatement and the Workers' Compensation Fund (hereinafter
"AAA") approves of the Utah Court of Appeals analysis and would have this Court apply the
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17, test
despite the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413. The need for the Union Pacific test,
however, was developed as a result of a question as to what decisions in the various
administrative agencies were appealable so as to start the time for the appeal running. In this
case, the statute itself determines when an order of permanent total disability is final and when it
is tentative, thereby obviating the need for the Union Pacific Test.
As previously stated, this Court already has ruled that it "will interpret a statute according
to its plain meaning and seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Machock v. Fink, 2006
UT 30, f 16, - P.3d - (citing, State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, f 11, - P.3d --). The plain language
of § 413 (6)(a) makes clear that an order of permanent total disability is not final until notice of a
second step is provided, the employer provides a rehabilitation plan or waives said plan, and the
administrative law judge holds a hearing on said rehabilitation plan.
By utilizing the Union Pacific test in the instant case would only add confusion and
muddy the water on what has previously been considered a fairly straight-forward statute. By
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utilizing the Union Pacific Test, this Court would add another layer of unnecessary procedure
when the statute itself explicitly mandates when a final agency action for purposes of appeal has
occurred with respect to permanent total disability cases. As a result, Ameritemps requests this
Court interpret the plain language of the statute as the statute unambiguously provides that a final
agency action for purposes of permanent total disability has not occurred until the Labor
Commission has provided the opportunity for a second-step rehabilitation hearing. As this was
not done in this case, the plain language of the statute should be followed and a second-step
rehabilitation hearing should be awarded so as to comply with the statute.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritemps respectfully requests this Court remand this case
to the Labor Commission for proceedings consistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413(6) as the Labor Commission's Order was not a final appealable order.
DATED THIS

^

day of August, 2006.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

n na..

-rfO^Clo

THEODORE E. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
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EXHIBIT A
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
1—

AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD
INSURANCE,

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
JOHNNY ALBERT'S APPELLEE BRIEF

Respondents/Appellants,
Supreme Court Case No.: 20051119
vs.

Appellate Case No.:

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and
JOHNNY ALBERT,

Agency Case Nos.:

20040953-CA
991213,20011073

Petitioners/Appellees.

COMES NOW the Appellants, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance (hereinafter
"Ameritemps"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby files this Motion to Strike
Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee's Brief pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
The purpose of this brief is to enforce the Utah Supreme Court's Order providing the
scope of this appeal. Ameritemps has complied with the singular issue certified by this Supreme
Court for review. Mr. Jolinny Albert (hereinafter "Mr. Albert") not only addressed the singular
issue certified for by the Supreme Court, but also included numerous arguments he raised before
the Court of Appeals. Mr. Albert's other arguments have exceeded the scope of this Court's
grant of review and, therefore, should be stricken from the record.
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Based upon the foregoing, Anieritemps respectfully requests the Supreme Court strike
portions of Mr. Albert's Appellee's Brief that exceed the scope of the issue certified for review
before the Supreme Court.
DATED THIS

* ? day of August, 2006.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

cy. .je 0.. (1/2!.

TJg*0DORB E. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Appellants
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Richard Burke, Esq.
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7390 South Creek Road, Suite 104
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Attorney for Respondent Johnny Albert

Floyd Holm, Esq.
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392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorney for American Asbestos Abatement and
Workers' Compensation Fund

Allen L. Hennebold, Esq.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
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James R. Black, Esq.
Black & Ingleby
265 East 100 South, Suite 255
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for American Asbestos Abatement and
Workers' Compensation Fund
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THEODORE E. KANELL (1768)
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA (9785)
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
Facsimile: (801)531-9747
Attorneys for Appellants

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD
INSURANCE,

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
JOHNNY ALBERT'S APPELLEE'S BRIEF

Respondents/Appellants,
Supreme Court Case No.: 20051119
vs.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and
JOHNNY ALBERT,

Appellate Case No.:

20040953-CA

Agency Case Nos.:

991213,20011073

Petitioners/Appellees.

COMES NOW the Appellants, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance (hereinafter
"Ameritemps"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby files this Motion to Strike
Portions of Johnny Albert's Appellee's Brief pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
INTRODUCTION
Ameritemps requests that portions of Mr. Johnny Albert's (hereinafter "Mr. Albert")
Appellee Brief be stricken from the record for exceeding the scope of the issues certified for
review before the Utah Supreme Court. Not only did Mr. Albert file his Appellee Brief a day
after the stipulated date for filing his brief had passed, but also Mr. Albert exceeded the scope of
this Court's grant of review. Mr. Albert not only addressed the singular issue certified for review

by the Supreme Court, but also included numerous arguments he raised before the Court of
Appeals. Mr. Albert's other arguments have exceeded the scope of this Court's grant of review
and, therefore, should be stricken from the record. Mr. Albert did not file a cross petition for a
writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court and, therefore, Mr. Albert is limited in his
arguments to the issue certified by Utah Supreme Court and can no longer restate or reargue
issues that he did not appeal from the Utah Court of Appeals decision.
As a result of failing to file his own petition for writ of certiorari challenging other
rulings made by the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Albert is precluded from otherwise challenging
said rulings and findings made by the Court of Appeals. As the Utah Supreme Court only
allowed a very narrow issue to be briefed on review, the Utah Supreme Court's order on the writ
of certiorari should be enforced and portions of Mr. Albert's brief that exceed the scope of the
issue on review should be stricken from the record.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision in the underlying
appeal. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 491, 138 P.3d 31, attached hereto
as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference.
2. Due to the Tenth falling on a weekend, Ameritemps filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
on December 12, 2005. See, Ameritemps'Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
3. On March 29, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court filed its Order granting Ameritemps'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See, Order dated March 29, 2006 (hereinafter the "Order"),
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference.
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4. In its Order, the Utah Supreme Court identified the sole issue to be addressed on review:
"Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." See, The Order, Exhibit B.
5. Mr. Albert did not file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and did not otherwise challenge
the Court of Appeals' findings and conclusions. See, Court Docket.
ARGUMENTS
I.

PORTIONS OF MR. ALBERT'S APPELLEE BRIEF SHOULD BE
STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD AS THOSE PORTIONS CONTAIN
ARGUMENTS THAT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THIS COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING AMERITEMPS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This Court granted Ameritemps' Petition for Writ of Certiorari on a singular issue
pertaining to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 and what is considered a final order for purposes of
Appellate Review. Specifically, this Court provided in its Order granting the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari that "...the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted only as to the following issue:
Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of appellate review." The Order, Exhibit B.
Ostensibly, anything that does not address the only issue presently before the Utah Supreme
Court should be stricken for exceeding the scope of the language in the Order. Anything that
exceeds the scope of the order should be stricken as not properly before this Court on review.
Because the record is devoid of any Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Mr. Albert
with respect to the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling below, the only issue properly before the Utah
Supreme Court is the singular question noted above. More importantly, the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "URAP") provide that "[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the
review of a judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Utah Court
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of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court."
URAPRule45.
Mr. Albert's failure to file for a writ of certiorari within the period set forth in URAP
Rule 48 (30 days) now precludes Mr. Albert from re-arguing the points he presented before the
Utah Court of Appeals. As further provided for in the rules, the petition for writ of certiorari is
important as the "only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be
considered by the Supreme Court." URAP Rule 49(a)(4). It was within Mr. Albert's ability to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals decision, but Mr. Albert
failed to file said petition and now is precluded from re-arguing or otherwise challenging the
findings and conclusions of the Utah Court of Appeals.
A review of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief illustrates that Mr. Albert is attempting to
challenge certain findings and conclusions made by the Court of Appeals. Because Mr. Albert
has exceeded the scope of the narrow question of law certified for review by this Court, portions
of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken as exceeding the scope of the issue being
considered by this Court.
Specifically, in sections 1-A through 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief he reiterates his
arguments proffered to the Utah Court of Appeals thereby attempting to expand the scope of the
issue before the Utah Supreme Court. Section 1-A discusses jurisdiction of this Court to hear the
appeal currently pending before this Court. Mr. Albert admits the Labor Commission did not
schedule a second step hearing, but argues that it did not do so because the Labor Commission
considered Mr. Albert unemployable. See, Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief, Page 1. No such finding
was ever made by the Labor Commission, nor by the Court of Appeals and, therefore, Section 1A of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record on appeal.
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Section 1-B of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record on appeal
as Mr. Albert failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court challenging the Court
of Appeals' ruling on whether Ameritemps waived its rights to a second step proceeding. The
Court of Appeals specifically found that Ameritemps did not waive its rights to a second step
proceeding as alleged by Mr. Albert. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App
491, \ 13, 138 P.3d 31, Exhibit A. Mr. Albert failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari
challenging this finding by the Court of Appeals and, therefore, Mr. Albert's arguments against
this finding should be stricken from the record as it exceeds the scope of the singular issue
currently before this Court. As a result, Section 1-B of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be
stricken from the record on appeal.
Similarly, Section 1~C in Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be stricken from the record
as it does not address the issue certified for review by this Court and re-argues issues Mr. Albert
presented to the Court of Appeals but did not appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. As Mr. Albert
did not appeal the merits of Ameritemps' appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals and did not file its
own cross-petition for writ of certiorari, Mr. Albert's arguments should be limited to the singular
argument certified by this Court for review. Consequently, Section 1-C should be stricken from
the record.
As with Section 1-B, above, Section 1-D of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief should be
stricken as Mr. Albert did not appeal the finding of the Court of Appeals with respect to the
Court's analysis regarding the stipulation. See, Ameritemps v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT
App 491, If 13, 138 P.3d 31, Exhibit A. Mr. Albert's failure to file a cross-petition for writ of
certiorari cannot be remedied at this late date by including arguments that he should have
appealed to this Court.

5

Given the strict rules regarding certification of questions to the Supreme Court as
provided in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. Albert's failure to comply with said
rules and properly challenge the Court of Appeals' ruling on the issue of the stipulation is
precluded as outside of the scope of the issue certified for review by this Court. If Mr. Albert
felt strongly that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis on the stipulation at the hearing, Mr.
Albert should have filed his own petition for writ of certiorari and challenged said findings by
the Court of Appeals.
To argue the case now, however, impermissibly exceeds the scope of the issue certified
for review by this Court. As Mr. Albert's arguments in Section 1-D in his Appellee Brief
exceeds the scope of the issue certified for review it should be stricken from the record on
appeal.
Finally, for the reasons detailed in Section 1-D, above, Section 1-E should be stricken
from the record on appeal as Mr. Albert again challenges the Court of Appeals' analysis
regarding its analysis on the finality of the underlying tentative finding of permanent total
disability. For the reasons asserted in opposition to Section 1-D, above, Ameritemps requests
this Court strike Section 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief for exceeding the scope of the issue
certified for review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Ameritemps respectfully requests this Court strike Sections 1A through 1-E of Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief. Not only was Mr. Albert's Appellee Brief filed
after the cutoff date for filing his Appellee Brief, but also the issues raised in his Appellee Brief
exceed the scope of the singular issue certified for review by this Court.

The arguments

exceeding the scope of the issue on review should be stricken from the record on appeal.
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EXHIBIT A

Page 1

LEXSEE 2005 UTAPP 491
Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Insurance, Petitioners, v. Labor Commission,
Workers' Compensation Fund, American Asbestos Abatement, and Johnny Albert,
Respondents.
Case No. 20040953-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2005 UTApp 491; 128 R3d 31; 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 55; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS
469
November 10, 2005, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari granted
Ameritemps v. Lbr Cmmn, 2006 Utah LEXIS 63 (Utah,
Mar. 30, 2006)

substantively identical to the relevant portions of
the version in effect at the time of Albert's injury,
see Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 1995), we
cite to the most current version throughout this
opinion as a convenience to the reader.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
j***2]
COUNSEL: Theodore E. Kanell and Joseph C.
Alamilla, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners.
Richard R. Burke, James R. Black, Alan L. Hennebold,
and Floyd W. Holm, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
JUDGES: Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Thome.
OPINIONBY: Carolyn B. McHugh
OPINION: [**34] Original Proceeding in this Court
McHUGH, Judge:
f***l] [*P1] Ameritemps, Inc. (Ameritemps) and
Hartford Insurance (collectively, Petitioners) seek judicial review of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) Appeals Board's (Board) denial of their motion for
review of a decision of a Commission Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) awarding Johnny Albert permanent
total disability compensation benefits. See Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005). nl We affirm.

nl We recognize that "in workers' compensation claims, the law existing at the time of the injury applies in relation to that injury." Brown &
Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d
671, 675 (Utah 1997). Because the relevant portions of the current version of this statute, see
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp. 2005), are

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Over the span of approximately seven years,
Albert was injured in a number of industrial accidents
that occurred while he was working for various employers. With the exception of his final accident, Albert returned to work after each incident, despite having suffered some level of whole person impairment. In his final
industrial accident, which occurred on June 16, 1997,
while he was working for Ameritemps, Albert severely
injured his left foot. Although he had four separate surgeries to correct the problems that resulted from this injury, Albert never returned to work.
[*P3] Thereafter, Albert filed a claim with the
Commission against Ameritemps for, among other
things, permanent total disability compensation benefits.
On December 17, 2002, a hearing was held before the
ALJ, which addressed numerous claims Albert had filed
with the Commission, including his claims against
Ameritemps. Albert's other claims were for disability
benefits arising out of industrial accidents that occurred
while he was working for employers other than Ameritemps. On July 22, 2003, the ALJ issued a decision regarding Albert's claims.
[*P4] As an initial matter, the ALJ [***3] noted in
the decision that all of the parties opposing Albert's
claims, including Ameritemps, had "conceded that [he]
was permanently and [**35] totally disabled," but that
each party "alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by [each party] directly caused [Al-

Page 2
2005 UT App 491, *; 128 P.3d 31, **;
538 Utah Adv. Rep. 55; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 469, ***
bert]'s permanent and total disability." The ALJ found,
based upon a medical evaluation contained in the record,
that the left foot injury Albert had suffered while working for Ameritemps "caused him a 4% whole person impairment." The ALJ also found that

the preponderance of the evidence in this
case revealed that despite the legion of
medical and psychological impairments
accumulated by [Albert] during the course
of his life, he remained able to work until
the injury he sustained on June 16, 1997[,]
with Ameritemps. [His left foot injury] on
June 16, 1997, with the subsequent four
surgeries and 4% whole person permanent
impairment, proved to be the proverbial
straw that broke the camel's back. [Albert]
never returned to work after the June 16,
1997 industrial accident, and thereafter by
consensus remained permanently and totally disabled.
[*P5] Based upon these findings, the [***4] applicable statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (Supp.
2005), and the odd-lot doctrine, see, e.g., Peck v. Eimco
Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 574-75 (Utah 1987);
Zupon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963-64
(Utah Ct. App. J993), the ALJ concluded that Albert was
permanently totally disabled and that the June 16, 1997
industrial accident, which occurred while Albert was
employed by Ameritemps, "directly caused his permanent total disability." Accordingly, the ALJ entered an
award of permanent total disability compensation benefits in favor of Albert and against Petitioners.
[*P6] On August 21, 2003, Petitioners filed a motion for review with the Board. On May 2, 2004, the
Board issued an order denying Petitioners' motion, affirming and adopting the ALJ's factual findings, and affirming the ALJ's decision as it applied to Petitioners.
Petitioners now seek judicial review of that order.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P7] Petitioners argue that this court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board's
order. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction presents
a question [***5] of law, which we review for correctness. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT81, P8,
31 P.3d 1147.
[*P8] Petitioners also argue that there is evidence
in the record that precludes an award of permanent total
disability compensation benefits to Albert and, as such,
the Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this
case. When reviewing the Board's decision, we will dis-

turb its factual findings only if they are "not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(g) (2004). Further, "when an agency has discretion
to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not disturb the agency's application unless its determination
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (quotations and citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
[*P9] Before arguing their challenge to the Board's
substantive decision, Petitioners argue that there has
been no final agency action creating subject matter jurisdiction in this court because the ALJ and the Board did
not complete the two-step [***6] process set forth under
the Workers' Compensation Act for establishing permanent total disability. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413
(Supp. 2005). In response, the Commission, Albert,
American Asbestos Abatement, and Workers' Compensation Fund (collectively, Respondents) assert that Petitioners failed to preserve this issue for appeal and waived
any argument that Albert is not permanently totally disabled. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Preservation and Waiver
[*P10] Petitioners concede that they did not raise
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction prior to their brief
with this court. Notwithstanding that admission, we may
consider it: "Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time because such issues determine whether a court has authority to address the merits of [**36] a particular case." Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT28, Pll, 44 P.3d 724. In addition, because
subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite to this court's
power to consider the substantive issues, the requirement
that the court have proper jurisdiction over the subject of
the dispute cannot be waived. See, e.g., [***7] Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P34, 100 P.3d 1177; Barnard v.
Wassermann, 855 P. 2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993). Issues
relating to subject matter jurisdiction are threshold questions that should be addressed before resolving other
claims. See Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at Pll. Because we
conclude that Petitioners' challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction is properly before us, we consider it before
addressing their challenge to the Board's substantive decision.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[*P11] The Utah Administrative Procedures Act
grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts over "final
agency actions." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l), (3)(a)
(2004). Thus, the first issue for consideration is whether
the Board's decision finding Albert permanently totally
disabled is a "final agency action," id., over which this
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court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. To answer
that question, we must examine the specific statutory
provisions involved.
[*P12] The procedure for establishing permanent
total disability is set forth in the Workers' Compensation
Act. See id. § 34A-2-413. Under that statutory [***8]
scheme, the injured employee must first meet his or her
burden of establishing permanent total disability and
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. §
34A-2-413(I)(b). The Commission must then consider
the evidence to determine whether the employee is permanently totally disabled and unable to perform reasonably available work. See id. § 34A-2-413(I)(c). Before
disability benefits can be awarded, however, the Commission must follow a two-step process outlined in section 34A-2-413. See id. § 34A-2-413(6). The Utah Supreme Court explained the procedure for awarding such
benefits in Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004
UT12, 84 P.3d 120J, stating:

Section 34A-2-413(6) outlines the process
an administrative law judge must follow
when determining whether an injured employee is entitled to permanent total disability compensation. This section requires that a finding be issued in two
parts—an initial finding and a final finding. The initial finding of permanent total
disability triggers a review period in
which the employer or its insurance carrier may submit a reemployment plan.
[See Utah Code Ann,] §
34A-24l3(6)(a)(ii) [***9] , (d). This subsection
specifically states that the initial "finding
by the Commission of permanent total
disability is not final, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties, until" the employer has the opportunity to submit a reemployment plan, the administrative law
judge reviews this reemployment plan and
the reemployment activities undertaken
pursuant to statute, and the administrative
law judge holds a hearing. Id. § 34A-2413(6)(a). The intent of the reemployment
plan is to determine whether the injured
employee can be rehabilitated in order to
reenter the workforce, and a final finding
of permanent total disability is held in reserve until the possibilities of reemployment are either exhausted or abandoned.
Only after all of these requirements have
been met does the finding of permanent
total disability become final.

Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P2L The Board's decision in this
case was issued after the initial determination of total
permanent disability, but before any opportunity for Petitioners to submit a reemployment plan. Thus, by the express terms of the Workers' Compensation Act, the "finding by the [Board] of permanent total disability is not
[***10] final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties,
until" after the employer is given an opportunity to submit a reemployment plan. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-24B(6)(a).
[*P13] Respondents argue that the parties agreed
that the initial determination of the Board was final as a
result of a colloquy between the ALJ and counsel for
Ameritemps. When the ALJ asked whether Ameritemps
was challenging that Albert was permanently totally disabled, counsel for Ameritemps responded: "I don't have
any proof to the contrary. I'm not here to submit [**37]
proof on that issue." We agree with the ALJ's deterrnination that Ameritemps conceded that Albert was permanently totally disabled for purposes of the initial finding
of disability and causation. There is nothing in the discussion between the ALJ and counsel for Ameritemps,
however, that supports a finding that Ameritemps intended to waive its right to submit a reemployment plan
if the industrial accident that occurred while Albeit was
employed by Ameritemps was found to be the direct
cause of Albert's permanent total disability. Thus, if this
court has subject matter jurisdiction, it must be based on
a conclusion that the [***H] initial determination of
permanent total disability is a final agency action.
[*P14] From a cursory reading of the Workers'
Compensation Act's pronouncement that the initial determination is not final, it might appear that this court
need inquire no further to conclude that the Board's order
at issue is not a "final agency action," id. § 63-4 6b14(1), (3)(a), and that this court is without subject matter
jurisdiction. The analysis of the Utah Supreme Court in
Thomas, however, requires that we consider both
whether the initial determination by the Board is a "final
order" of that agency, and separately, whether it is a "final agency action." See 2004 UT 12 at PI4. Although the
terms are similar, they are different in their effect on this
court's jurisdiction.
[*P15] In Thomas, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether an initial determination of permanent
total disability under section 34A-2-413 was a '"final
order'" of the Commission for which an abstract of
judgment could be issued allowing the employee to enforce the temporary disability award in district court. Id.
at PI I. After reviewing the language of section 34A-2413, the Thomas [***12] court concluded that "because
initial findings are not final orders, subsistence payment
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orders predicated upon initial findings are also not final
orders." Id. at P25. In the absence of a final order from
the Commission, no abstract was available. See Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-212(l)(a) (2001) ("An abstract of
any final order providing an award may be filed . . . in
the office of the clerk of the district court of any county
in the state.").
[*P16] In reaching its conclusion, the Thomas
court distinguished between a '"final order"' of an agency
that could support an abstract of judgment and a '"final
agency action"' that can confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the appellate courts. Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI4.

Although the Utah Administrative Procedures Act grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts over "final agency actions," it
"does not specifically define" this term.
Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 970
P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998). Since this act
does not provide a definition, we developed the Union Pacific test to determine
when administrative orders constitute "final agency actions" [***13] in order to
invoke appellate jurisdiction. [See Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
2000 UT 40, PI6, 999 P.2d 17]. Unlike
the term "final agency action," the term
"final order" is defined in the Workers'
Compensation Act. Because this act
clearly defines "final order," we need not
turn to Union Pacific for guidance on
what constitutes a "final order" for which
an abstract may issue. Thus, what constitutes a final order for puiposes of appellate review is different than what constitutes a final order for puiposes of the issuance of an abstract of an administrative
award.

Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P14. The Thomas court then
determined that an initial finding of permanent total disability was not a "final order" as defined by the Workers'
Compensation Act. See id. at P25. But, the Thomas court
did not consider whether an initial decision of the Commission finding permanent total disability is a "final
agency action" that can confer subject matter jurisdiction
on an appellate court for puiposes of judicial review. It
merely indicated that the analysis of that question should
be performed using the test announced [*** 14] in Union
Pacific. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5.
[*P17] The recent per curiam decision from a divided panel of this court in Target Trucking v. Labor

Commission, 2005 UT App 70, 108 P. 3d 128 (mem.) (per
curiam), [**38] may have confused these two concepts.
In Target Trucking, we dismissed an appeal of a preliminary determination of permanent total disability for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the statutory
language. See id. at P6\ see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A2-413(6)(a) ("A finding by the Commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed
to by the parties . . . . " ) . In doing so, this court made no
distinction between a "final order" and a "final agency
action," and did not apply the Union Pacific three-part
test to determine whether we should exercise appellate
jurisdiction. See Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. In considering the issue now before this court, we apply that
test to answer the initial question concerning this court's
subject matter jurisdiction. "Although the Union Pacific
test does not apply to determining what constitutes
[***15] a 'final order' for which an abstract may issue
under the Workers' Compensation Act, Union Pacific
continues to be the standard by which 'final administrative action' will be judged for the purpose of judicial review." Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at PI5.
[*P18] In Union Pacific, the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the following three-part test to determine
whether an agency action is final:

(1) Has administrative decision making
reached a stage where judicial review will
not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?;
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal consequences flow
from the agency action?; and
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in
part, not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent agency action?

Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. Agency actions that
meet the foregoing test are appealable from the date of
the order's issuance. See id.
[*P19] Examining the Board's order under the
three-part test set forth in Union Pacific, we conclude
that the order is a final agency action.
A. Orderly Process of Adjudication
[*P20] This matter comes [***16] to this court after the Board's denial of Petitioners' motion for review of
the ALJ's decision. "By denying reconsideration of its
earlier findings and conclusions, the [Board] reached the
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end of its decision making process" on the issue of permanent total disability. Id. at PI9. The Board's order
denying Petitioners' motion for review includes a "Notice
of Appeal Rights" section, which provides that a party
may either (1) within twenty days of the date of the order, request that the Board reconsider the order, or (2)
within thirty days of the date of the order, petition this
court for judicial review of the order. A request for reconsideration was filed by a party that was involved in
the proceedings before the Commission, but is not a
party to this appeal. In the Board's order denying that
request for reconsideration, the "Notice of Appeal
Rights" section identified an appeal to this court as the
only review available. n2 When the Board denied the
request for reconsideration, that marked the end of its
decision making process concerning the issue of permanent total disability.

Because of the nature of agency proceedings, final actions often take place seriatim, disposing [***17] completely of discrete issues in one order while leaving
other issues for later orders. Such orders
will be final as to any issue fully decided
by that order and appealable any time
from the date of that order to the last day
to appeal the last final agency action in
the case.

Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 970 P.2d 702, 706
(Utah 1998). Although issues remained unresolved concerning the possibility of reemployment, the question of
whether Albert was permanently totally disabled was
disposed of completely by the Board. Thus, "judicial
review would not . . . interfere[] with the [Board]'s proceedings, since the [**39] [Board] had already refused
to reconsider its prior order[]." Union Pac, 2000 UT 40
at PI 9.
n2 The Utah Supreme Court has indicated
that "although omission of this language is not
dispositive for our purposes on the question of
whether an agency order is final, it certainly signals . . . that the [agency] believes it is." Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000
UT40,P19n.6,999P.2d
17.
[***18]
B. Rights or Obligations Determined
[*P21] In the decision from which Petitioners appeal, the Board determined that Albert is permanently

totally disabled and also awarded permanent total disability compensation payments to Albert to start immediately. Consequently, the second part of the Union Pacific
test is met. See Barker, 970 P.2d at 706 (detemiining
that agency action was final where "the language of the
order makes clear that the [agency] determined obligations of the parties with which the parties must immediately comply"); see also Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at P20
(concluding that the second prong of the three-part test
was met where taxpayer's tax obligations were determined).
C. Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural, or Intermediate
[*P22] The third step in detemiining whether
agency action is final for puiposes of appeal is an analysis of whether that action is, "in whole or in part, not
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate."
Union Pac, 2000 UT 40 at PI6. The Utah Supreme
Court has provided examples of the types of proceedings
that are not final under this last prong of the Union Pacific [***19] analysis.

The Utah cases on finality found no final
order in the following circumstances: (1)
a remand for further proceedings, Sloan v.
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 464
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); (2) an order converting informal proceedings into formal
ones, Merit Elec & Instrumentation v.
Department of Commerce, 902 P.2d 151,
153 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); and (3) a denial
of a motion to dismiss, Barney v. Division
of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). These cases do not involve actions
in the nature of a seriatim final order; they
all involve preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate decisions.

Barker, 970 P.2d at 706; see also Union Pac, 2000 UT
40atP2J.
[*P23] Although the Board's order leaves unresolved the issue of reemployment, it decides permanent
total disability with finality. The order ended the decision
making process at the agency level on this issue. Thus,
the initial determination of permanent total disability was
in the nature of a seriatim final order that was immediately appealable despite the fact that the [***20] agency
still was required to conduct the second part of the section 34A-2-413 analysis to determine whether Albert can
be rehabilitated. n3 To the extent our decision in Target
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Trucking v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 70, J08
P. 3d 128 (mem.) (per curiam), holds otherwise, we disavow it and instead follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court in Thomas v. Color Countiy Management,
2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201, to consider the issues of finality for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under the
Union Pacific test, see 2000 UT 40 at PI 6.

n3 This second step can be avoided if the
parties agree that the finding of permanent total
disability is final, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(6)(a), or if the ALJ is provided with notice
that the employer or its insurance earner will not
submit a reemployment plan. See id. § 34A-2413(6)(a)(ii)(B).
[*P24] This conclusion that the initial determination of permanent total disability [***21] is not a final
order of the agency, but is a final agency action, also
reconciles the statutory language with the applicable
regulations. Section 34A-2-413(6)(a) expressly states that
the initial determination is not final and, based on that
language, the Utah Supreme Court held in Thomas that
the initial determination is not a "final order" of the
agency. See 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the Commission's regulations state that "[a] preliminary determination of permanent total disability by the Labor Commissioner or [the] Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate judicial review." Utah Admin. Code
R612-l-10(C)(l)(c).
[*P25] Because the concepts of "final order" and
"final agency action" are defined differently, the statute
and the regulation can [**40] be reconciled. n4 An initial determination of permanent total disability is not a
final order of the agency and, therefore, an abstract of
judgment cannot be issued to enforce a pemianent total
disability compensation award based on that preliminary
finding. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at P25. In contrast, the
preliminary determination of permanent total disability
does conclude the [***22] agency decision making on
the initial question of whether Albert is permanently totally disabled. Thus, it is a seriatim final agency action,
and this court does have subject matter jurisdiction to
review it.

n4 In Target Trucking v. Labor Commission,
2005 UT App 70, P6, 108 P.3d 128 (mem.) (per
curiam), this court concluded, without applying
the Union Pacific test for finality, that the administrative rule was in conflict with the express
statutory provisions. Because we hold that a preliminary determination of pemianent total disabil-

ity is a final agency action, but not a final order
of the agency, we now harmonize the rule and the
statute.
III. Substantive Review of Board's Order
[*P26] Having concluded that we have subject
matter jurisdiction to review the Board's order, we now
turn to Petitioners' substantive challenge to that order.
Petitioners argue that there is evidence in the record that
precludes an award of permanent total disability compensation benefits to Albert and, [***23] therefore, the
Board incorrectly applied the law to the facts in this case.
We disagree.
[*P27] To advance their argument that there is evidence in the record that precludes an award of permanent
total disability compensation benefits, Petitioners selectively recite the portions of the record evidence that support their position. Based on that selective recitation of
the facts presented to the agency, Petitioners assert that
the Board should have reached a different conclusion.
This argument amounts to an indirect challenge to the
Board's factual findings concerning the June 16, 1997
industrial accident, and is an attempt by Petitioners to
reargue the weight of the evidence in favor of their position, which is a futile tactic on appeal. See Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178
(Utah 1993) ("When reviewing an agency's decision, [we
do] not . . . reweigh the evidence."). Further, we will not
disturb the Board's findings simply because another conclusion can be drawn from the evidence in the record.
See Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "findings will 'not be overturned [***24] if based on substantial evidence, even if
another conclusion from the evidence is permissible'"
(citation omitted)). Because Petitioners do not directly
challenge any of the Board's factual findings concerning
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, we assume that
they are supported by the record and do not disturb them.
n5 See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312
(Utah 1997) ("When a party fails to challenge a factual
finding and marshal the evidence in support of that finding, we 'assume[] that the record supports the finding[] . .
. .'" (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)).

n5 Even if Petitioners had directly challenged the Board's factual findings concerning
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, that challenge would have failed because Petitioners
failed to marshal the evidence in support of those
findings in their opening brief. See Campbell v.
Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) ("When a party fails to marshal the
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we
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reject the challenge as nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case before [the appellate]
court." (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)). Moreover, after this failure was
noted by Respondents in their briefs, Petitioners
attempted to undertake the marshaling burden in
their reply brief and, after doing so, admitted that
there was evidence in the record that "could support" the Board's findings. Our review of the record indicates that the Board's findings are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4)(g) (2004).
[***25]
[*P28] Petitioners also argue that the Board misapplied the law to the facts of this case. More specifically,
Petitioners argue that had the Board made different factual findings based upon the aforementioned evidence
that supports their position, it would have reached a different legal conclusion. Given that we have already rejected Petitioners' arguments concerning the Board's factual findings, we must determine whether the Board's
application of the law to those undisturbed findings "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness [**41] and rationality." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct.
App. J997) (quotations and citation omitted).
[*P29] In relevant part, the statute governing permanent total disability compensation benefits provides:

(b) To establish entitlement to permanent
total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by
a preponderance of evidence that:

(i) the employee sustained
a significant impairment or
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives
rise to the permanent total
disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally [***26] disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident
or occupational disease
was the direct cause of the

employee's permanent total
disability.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii).
[*P30] The Board made findings relevant to each
of these elements. With respect to the first element, the
ALJ found n6 that "the preponderance of the evidence in
this case established that [AlbertJ's industrial accident
with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997[,] caused him a 4%
whole person impairment due to his left foot injury." The
ALJ also found that the preponderance of the evidence
revealed that the injury Albert suffered as a result of the
June 16, 1997 industrial accident, "with the subsequent
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the
camel's back." Concerning the second element, the ALJ
found that Albert "never returned to work after the June
16, 1997 industrial accident, and thereafter by consensus
remained permanently and totally disabled." Finally, as
to the third element, the ALJ found that "the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that [AlbertJ's industrial accident [***27] of June 16, 1997[,]
acted as the direct cause of his permanent total disability."

n6 In its order, the Board "affirmed and
adopted [the ALJJ's findings of fact."
[*P31] Based upon these undisturbed findings, the
Board concluded that Albert was permanently totally
disabled and that the June 16, 1997 industrial accident,
which occurred while Albert was employed by Ameritemps, "was the direct cause of his permanent total disability." Accordingly, the Board entered an award of
permanent total disability compensation benefits in favor
of Albert and against Petitioners. Given that the Board
made the appropriate findings to support its conclusion
under the statute, we cannot say that its conclusion "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Mity
Lite, 939 P.2d at 686 (quotations and citation omitted).
Therefore, we affirm the Board's order denying Petitioners' motion for review of the ALJ's decision.
CONCLUSION
[*P32] The Board's preliminary determination of
permanent total [***28] disability is a seriatim final
agency action, and this court does have subject matter
jurisdiction to review it. After reviewing the Board's order, we conclude that its factual findings were based
upon substantial evidence and that its application of the
law to those findings did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Therefore, we affirm.
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Giegory K Orme, Judge
CaiolynB McHugh, Judge
[*P33] WE CONCUR
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For The Court:

Date

^ 7 afflt

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I nereby certify that on March 30, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited m the United States mail or
placed m the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
RICHARD R BURKE
KING BURKE & SCHAAP PC
7390 CREEK RD STE 104
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84093-5121
THEODORE E KANELL
JOSEPH C ALAMILLA
PLANT CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 E S TEMPLE STE 1700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
ALAN L HENNEBOLD
LABOR COMMISSION
160 E 300 S STE 300
PO BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
JAMES R BLACK
BLACK AND INGLEBY
265 E 100 S STE 255
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
FLOYD W HOLM
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
392 E 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
4 50 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
LABOR COMMISSION
ATTN SARA DANIELSON
160 E 300 S 3RD FL
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Dated this March 30, 2006.

Depuxy Clerk
dase No 20051119-SC
Court of Appeals Case No
Labor Commission Case No

20C40953
991213

EXHIBIT B

FILED
-H APPELLATE C-OU

!

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
--00O00--

< 2 9 200K

Ameritemps, I n c . a n d / o r
Hartford I n s u r a n c e ,
Petitioners,
Case No. 20051119-SC
20040953-CA
Labor Commission,
Johnny A l b e r t ,

and

Respondents,

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on December 12, 2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 45 Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue:
Whether an initial finding of permanent total disability
under Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-2-413 constitutes a final agency action
for purposes of appellate review.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension.
Additionally,
absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

For The Court:

Date
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T

Christine M. Durham
Chief Jusrice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I nereby certify that on March 30, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited m the United States mail or
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
RICHARD R BURKE
KING BURKE & SCHAAP PC
7390 CREEK RD STE 104
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84 093-5121
THEODORE E. KANELL
JOSEPH C ALAMILLA
PLANT CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 E S TEMPLE STE 17 00
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
ALAN L HENNEBOLD
LABOR COMMISSION
160 E 300 S STE 300
PO BOX 14 6600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
JAMES R BLACK
BLACK AND INGLEBY
265 E 100 S STE 255
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
FLOYD W HOLM
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
3 92 E 64 00 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 14 0230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
LABOR COMMISSION
ATTN: SARA DANIELSON
160 E 300 S 3RD FL
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Dated this March 30, 2006.
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